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RACE[,] SCIENCE, HISTORY, AND LAW*
David S. Caudill**
Evolutionary psychology ... can be used to justify every
outcome. This is why [Steven] Pinker has persuaded
himself that liberal democracy and current opinion about
women's sexual autonomy have biological foundations. It's
a "scientific" validation of the way we live now. But every
aspect of life has a biological foundation in exactly the same
sense, which is that unless it was biologically possible it
wouldn't exist. After that, it's up for grabs.'
While the practice of science is unavoidably a cultural activity,
"embedded in" culture, the conventional epistemology of science is that
"when sciences function at their very best, their institutions, cultures, and
practices, including scientific methods, will contribute nothing culturally
distinctive to the representations of nature that appear in the results of
research. 2 Culture provides a framework, that is, but "should not influence
the results of research in any culturally distinctive way." 3  In this
perspective, the cultural aspects of science are "accounted for" by
distinguishing between those that are legitimate or supportive features and
those that are illegitimate or unscientific. For example, when historians,
sociologists, ethnographers, or rhetoricians of science variously identify the
social, political, economic, institutional, professional, narrative, interpretive,
and rhetorical features of science, an accounting process begins. Epistemic
values (consistency , honesty) do not interfere, while social values (ethical
concerns) do; institutional training, gatekeeping, and professionalization,
along with negotiation and consensus-building techniques, and even
dominant discursive regimes and governing metaphors or models can all be
helpful (even though they sometimes lead to errors); rhetoric is more
dangerous, unless it is ornamental; finally, race, class, and gender "values"
are always controversial and problematic-these have no place in science.
. This article is based on a paper delivered at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Mid-Atlantic People of
Color Legal Scholarship Conference, held at Washington and Lee University School of Law (Jan. 30-Feb.
1,2003).
.. J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1 Louis Menand, What Comes Naturally (book review of STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE
MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2002)), THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 98.
2 See SANDRA HARDING, IS SCIENCE MULTI-CULTURAL?: POSTCOLONIALISMS, FEMINISMS, AND
EPISTEMOLOGIES 3 (1998).
3 Id. ("Any and all social values that might initially get into the results of scientific research should be
firmly weeded out as soon as possible through subsequent critical vigilance.").
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"Race science" is almost always, therefore, a pejorative reference to
a discredited series of episodes in the history of science. Nancy Stepan, in
The Idea of Race in Science. Great Britain 1800-1960,4 identifies in the rise
and fall of racial science-i.e., in scientific racism-
the impact on scientific arguments of strong if subtle convictions
about the different moral, intellectual and physical worth of
different human groups . . . . [E]vidence, often sketchy and
incomplete, was unconsciously manipulated to fit preconceived
notions. As a result, an objective assessment about human
variation was prevented by practices and procedures embedded in
science itself.5
Significantly, Stepan does not characterize race science as "pseudoscience,"
since it was often first-rate scientists whose biases and overgeneralizations
functioned within the "accepted canons of scientific procedure of their
day."
6
So "natural," deep, and fixed did the differences between human
races seem to scientists ... that the scientists' view of human races
served to structure the very reception they gave to novel scientific
theories and to influence the interpretation they put upon new
empirical data .... To a large extent, the history of racial science
is a history of a series of accommodations ... to the demands of
deeply held convictions about the "naturalness" of the inequalities
7between human races.
The blatant racism of Scottish anatomist Robert Knox--"with me, race or
hereditary descent is everything; it stamps the man"8-was "shared . . .
almost unconsciously" by most British scientists in the mid-nineteenth-
4 NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA OF RACE IN SCIENCE: GREAT BRITAIN 1800-1960 (1982).
5 Id. at xv.
6 See id. at xvi. See also STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21-22 (1981) (discussing racism
among distinguished nineteenth-century scientists).
I criticize the myth that science is an objective enterprise, done properly only when
scientists can shuck the constraints of their culture and view the world as it really is
.... Science ... is a socially embedded activity .... Much of its change through
time [records] the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly.
Id.
7 STEPAN, supra note 4, at xx-xxi.
8 See ROBERT KNOx, THE RACES OF MEN: A FRAGMENT 6 (1850).
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century. 9 Paradoxically, racial science became more racist as it became
more scientific--"based on a wider set of data, more sophisticated
measurements, and a deeper knowledge of biological processes and
functions . ,1o "The hierarchy of races was believed to correspond to,
and indeed to be the cause of, what most people took to be the natural scale
of achievement in the world, with the European on top and the African or
aboriginal Australian invariably at the bottom.", Notwithstanding Darwin's
own opposition to slavery and overt racism, his argument for evolutionary
continuity "led, almost inevitably, to the use of lower races to fill the gap
between animals and man. Later, scientists would find it only too easy to
interpret Darwin as meaning that the races of man now formed an
evolutionary scale."' 12 While anti-evolutionist Theodore Waitz (writing just
after Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859) argued that "the
absolute permanence of the physical type is nothing but a prejudice,
possessing no scientific value whatsoever to serve as a basis for the
assumption of a plurality of the human species,"'13 environmentalism and
monogynism gave way to an integration of racialist typology and
polygynism with evolutionism.'
4
In the early nineteenth-century, "with racism firmly established in
popular opinion and in science,"' 5 eugenics provided another scientific basis
for prioritizing heredity over environmental factors. Although eugenics
theoretically does not necessitate a link with race, 6 scientific racism was
reinforced by the science of human heredity until Nazi anti-Semitism "called
forth from anthropologists the most consistent and straightforward
repudiation of some of the myths of race science."' 7 The role of race in
science, however, remained unsettled-there are no pure or superior races,
races do not differ in mental abilities, and culture is not defined by race, but
what is "race," and what is the new human science that replaced race
science? "Race has lost its reality and naturalness, to such an extent that
9 See STEPAN, supra note 4, at 4.
10 See id. at 5, 46. See also HARDING, supra note 2, at 135 ("When a scientific community shares
assumptions, there is little chance that more careful application of existing scientific methods will detect
them.").
I I STEPAN, supra note 4, at 46.
12 See id. at 55.
13 THEODORE WALTZ, INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY 101 (1863) ("It certainly cannot occur to any
ethnographer to separate in the lands of the Moors, the Berber, Gothic, Phoenician, Roman, Greek
elements, etc.... according to cranial shape .. .
14 See STEPAN, supra note 4, at 110.
5Seeid. at I11.
16 See generally id. at 124-43.
17Seeid. at 167.
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probably the majority of scientists even go so far as to consider the word
'race' unnecessary for purposes of biological analysis., 18 A new non-racial,
populational, genetic science of human diversity studies nature, and the
studying of nurture--of racism and race relations-is given to sociologists,
economists, and psychologists. Still, we worry that, in Stepan's words,
contemporary scientists are no more isolated today, "in a scientific
'republic' of their own," than the race scientists of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, who "inherited from [their] larger society distinct social,
philosophical, metaphysical, theological, political and aesthetic traditions, as
well as scientific ones." 19 In short, does "race" continue unconsciously to
shape "the way scientists [define] scientific problems and the scientific
theories they put forward to explain them"?2°
Joseph Pugliese, in his study of forensic pathology, finds in that
field's "typical body charts" an "unacknowledged racialisation of bodies"-
"unreflexive racist inscriptions ... mark non-white bodies in the texts and
handbooks of the discipline.",21 "In all the texts that I examined, the
18See id. at 171. For example, in a PBS three-part documentary series entitled "Race-The Power of an
Illusion," race was presented as a social construction rather than a biological reality, since "current
science tells us that biological races don't exist." See California Newsreel, Race-The Power of an
Illusion (Apr. 24, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/race/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2003). The third episode
"uncovers how race resides not in nature but in politics, economics and culture." See California
Newsreel, Helping Remedy American Myths About Race, http://www.newsreel.org/films/race.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2003). For a somewhat contrary view, see MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO, RoY G. SPECE, JR.,
REBECCA DRESSER, & ELLEN WRIGHT CLAYTON, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS OF
LAW 98-101 (2003).
A caution about genetics and race: there is a growing literature urging that for
biologists, "there is no such thing as race," or "race is not a scientific concept."
The idea of race is only "socially constructed and is thus a largely arbitrary
classification having little or no connection to a fixed genetic inheritance ....
... One reason for this "skeptical view" seems to be that there is no
precise definition of race--no necessary and sufficient conditions for ascriptions of
race-and there are many indeterminate cases. But virtually all useful abstractions
"fail" at various points-and this includes some important scientific concepts.
(Indeed, their usefulness may rest in part on such flaccidity.)
•.. The point here is simply that [race] can't be dubbed "nonscientific"
just because of the absence of such definitive criteria ....
.. . It is hard to see how [the] statistical identifications [involved in
blood sicklying disorders or Tay-Sachs disease] are matters of pure "social
construction" rather than "biology".... Obviously, the entire human race isn't
hallucinating when it refers to differing racial groups.
Id. at 98, 100.
19 See id. at xiv-xv.
20 See id. at xv (In race science, ideology was "embedded in scientific argument.").
21 See Joseph Pugliese, "Super Visum Corporis": Visuality, Race. Narrativity and the Body of Forensic
Pathology, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 367, 368 (2002).
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anatomical illustration of the human body was identifiably "Caucasian" or
white European in appearance. The white body in these visual illustrations
assumes universalist dimensions as it is represented as the template of the
human body. ' 22  Such racialised images "position themselves as
scientifically 'neutral,' 'objective' and 'universal,"' and "[ilt is only against
the foil and gauge of the white body that 'racial pigmentation,' 'flared
nostrils,' 'epicanthic folds' and 'crinkled hair' attain their self-evident status
as synecdoches of racial difference [-] physical attributes that are marked by
a visual excess that transgresses the law of the body proper. 23 When these
attributes are presented (in one forensic medicine text) as "obvious features
which need no medical knowledge, 24 they not only "reproduce and
consolidate racism as common sense" but "produce a series of discursive
effects" wherein "whiteness is preserved in its anonymity" (e.g., "this man")
and racial or ethnic descriptions are reserved for non-white "outsiders" (e.g.,
"this Pakistani male").25 "The demand to keep whiteness as the unsaid
ensures that whites continue to occupy a privileged position that is seen to
transcend racial categories and descriptors .... This is what generates the
sense of... unexpected naming of race and ethnicity in otherwise seemingly
'race-free' cases. 26  Contemporary "neutral scientific drawings" must,
Pugliese argues, be situated in the "long history of scientific racism"
wherein the body of the white male functioned as a universal standard. 7
Returning to that history, another example involving science
museum displays introduces the conflict between the erasure of race as a
biologically significant category and multicultural efforts to maintain racial
and ethnic identities.
22 Id. at 375. "At the level of racial representation ... whites are not of a certain race, they'rejust the
human race." RICHARD DYER, WHITE 3 (1997).
Iconographically, the "typical body" charts in [forensic pathology] texts bear a
striking resemblance to the visual image of humans sent into outer space by NASA
on the Pioneer 10 spacecraft, where, uncoincidentally, the white body was imposed
with the burden of representing the "generic" human to all other civilizations in the
universe.
Pugliese, supra note 21, at 375.
23 See Pugliese, supra note 21, at 376. Racial attributes are "finessed away from the white template body,
only to be 'discovered' out there in the disordered world of racialised corporealites that exceeds the
normativity of schematic borders and limits." Id. at 376.
24 See BERNARD KNIGHT, SIMPSON'S FORENSIC MEDICINE 32 (1997).
25 See Pugliese, supra note 21, at 377-79.
26 Id. at 379.
27 See id. at 377.
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In 1933, the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago mounted
an ambitious exhibition entitled Races of Mankind, which
consisted of 101 life-size bronze sculptures [created by Malvina
Hoffman] of the 'principal' human racial types . . . . The
exhibition ... was a huge success initially, attracting millions of
28visitors and much attention from the press.
Claiming scientific authority from its location in a science museum, the
exhibit unwittingly "reified Western notions of class, culture and race,
placing Europeans and white Americans at the peak of racial evolution. 29
By the 1960s, the exhibit was dismantled after coming under attack for being
both scientifically inaccurate as well as socially indefensible; however, in
the 1970's the figures were reinstalled outside the exhibition halls as random
examples of people of the world. 30  By 1993, the sculptures could "be
viewed by some visitors as remarkably evocative and authoritative
depictions of humanity, not as monuments to racial hierarchy, nor as
despicable totems of institutionalized racism, but as hopeful tributes to
human spirit and diversity., 31 The problem, as Tracy Lang Teslow points
out, is that while the sculptures were supposedly transformed from race
science to realistic examples of our glorious diversity, they remained
stereotypical (Hawaiian surfing, African with spear, Chinese man pulling a
rickshaw) and troubling. 32 In contrast to the other full-size figures with
exotic clothing and cultural trappings, the sculpture entitled "American,
from Brooklyn New York" was a white body builder, "implying a
transcendence of culture, of class, even of race . . . ."" "The exhibition...
implicitly, in its conception, arrangement and existence in a natural history
museum, promulgated the idea that races are bounded, natural entities which
we can objectively and unambiguously record and understand. 34 The idea
that these particular "decorative objects" can be displayed on the periphery
of the scientific exhibits, "without any order or hierarchy and without any
anthropological information,"3 to demonstrate the demise of race science
and to celebrate diversity, seems on reflection simply naive.
28 Tracy Lang Teslow, Reifying Race: Science and art in the Races of Mankind at the Field Museum of
Natural History, in THE POLITICS OF DISPLAY: MUSEUMS, SCIENCE, CULTURE 53 (S. Macdonald ed.,
1998).29 See id.
'0 See id. at 54, 73.
3' See id. at 54.32 See id. at 64-66.
33 See id. at 67.34 Id. at 69.
" See id. at 73.
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Returning again to the history of race science, some of its critics in
the early twentieth century provided a more compelling basis for the
contemporary discourse of multiculturalism and of racial and ethnic
identities. Both W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) and Franz Boas (1858-1942)
"criticized provincial and essentialist forms of identity" in response to their
own experiences of marginalization and rootlessness.36 In 1894, a hundred
years before the American Association for the Advancement of Science
("AAAS") would announce that "the concept of race . . .has no basis in
fundamental human biology,, 37 Boas argued that notwithstanding the
variations inside any single race, the "achievements of races do not warrant
us to assume that one race is more highly gifted than the other., 38 When Du
Bois invited Boas to visit Atlanta University in 1906, where Du Bois was
teaching history, Boas (in a commencement address) told his audience that
they should be proud of their African past and the achievements of black
kingdoms of the South Sahara. 39 Recognizing difference but not inequality,
Boas encouraged a diasporic identity that Du Bois pushed further into "what
might be called 'anti-anti-racism"' by advocating "against the tendency to
obliterate.., racial differences and divisions.
40
Instead of emphasizing physical characteristics, however, Du Bois
stressed the commonality of "a vast family of human beings,
generally of common blood and language, always of common
history, traditions, and impulses, who are both voluntarily and
involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain
more or less vividly conceived ideals of life."
41
This effort to undermine biologistic reductionism, while at the same time
retaining notions of "blood" and introducing modem ideas of nationhood,
has been defended by Lucius Outlaw as a cluster concept of "race,"
"draw[ing] together under a single word references to biological, cultural,
36 See Julia E. Liss, Diasporic Identities: The Science and Politics of Race in the Work of Franz Boas
and W.E.B. Du Bois, 1894-1919,13 CULT. ANTHROP. 127, 128-29 (1998).37 See Robert Lee Hotz, Is Concept of Race a Relic?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995, at A I
(reporting on February 1995 AAAS meeting in Los Angeles, California).3
8 See FRANZ BOAS, Human Faculty as Determined by Race, in A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAPING
OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911 222,227 (G. Stocking ed., 1974), quoted in Liss, supra note
36, at 131.
39 
See W.E.B. Du BOIS, BLACK FOLK: THEN AND NOw: AN ESSAY IN THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF
THE NEGRO RACE vii (1939).40
See Liss, supra note 36, at 132.
41 See id. at 132 (quoting W.E.B. Du BOiS, The Conservation of Races, American Negro Academy,
Occasional Papers, No. 2, in W.E.B. DU BOIS: WRITINGS 817 (1986)).
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and geographical factors thought characteristic of a population., 42 Echoes of
Du Bois's cluster concept of race can be heard in Outlaw's own recent
description of his doctoral dissertation:
Part of the core agenda of the Black Power Movement was to call
for, in very forceful, critical terms, the remaking of Negroes into
Black people, and African people in America, who were to be
properly defined and identified, and who were to properly
understand themselves as being defined and identified, by a shared
culture made distinctive by being constituted by elements the
meanings and living experiences of which were decisively those of
black people. It was to the philosophical articulation of these
proper understandings that I was so very anxious to contribute.43
Updating his thesis, Outlaw continues to believe that Americans "can
embrace and nurture to good ends non-invidious affirmations of racial and
ethnic identities." 44
Reminiscent of Wendy Williams' warning that feminists can't have
it both ways--equal rights based on sameness and special treatment based
on difference,45 the acknowledgment of "race" as a cluster that includes
biological "factors" seems to carry a cost. After all, the scientific
establishment has finally, in the official discourse of the AAAS, rendered
race irrelevant to biology; in the cognitivistic craze to prioritize nature over
nurture, the last discovery you want made is that race means something at
the level of neuronal hardware. Nevertheless, the traditional and persistent
notion that race is either a biologically significant category (as it was for
race scientists) or a social construction (based only on a common cultural
and historical inheritance) is itself problematic.
Charles Shepherdson draws upon Lucius Outlaw's conception of
race as a mixture of physical features and cultural matters (including
language, behavior, and ideas) in his challenge to simplistic distinctions
between nature and nurture.46
42 See Liss, supra note 36, at 132-33 (quoting Lucius Outlaw, 'Conserve'Races? In Defense of WE.B.
Du Bois, in W.E.B. DU BOIS ON RACE AND CULTURE 20 (B. Bell, E. Grosholz & J. Stewart eds., 1996)).
43See Lucius Outlaw, Jr., Cultural Hermeneutics and Racialized Life-Worlds: Unfinished Work, 24
PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 101, 102 (1998).
44 See id. at 107.
45 See Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985). On the "dilemma of difference," see also
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990).
46 See Charles Sheperdson, Human Diversity and the Sexual Relation, in THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF RACE
46 (C. Lane ed., 1998) (citing Lucius Outlaw, Towards a Critical Theory of Race, in ANATOMY OF
RACISM 58 (D. Goldberg ed., 1990)).
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Cultural critics today might be tempted to insist that race . . . is
really a symbolic effect, a contingent product of discursive
practices that is wrongly "naturalized" as a biological fact.
Directly opposed to these critics ...certain members of today's
scientific community celebrate "the revival of interest in the
biological roots of human nature" .... , claiming that race is really
a biological fact.
47
These "familiar alternatives," Shepherdson points out, tend to eclipse the
history of both the term "race," which does not have a unified meaning, and
"the disciplines that promise to explain it, including contemporary cultural
theory and genetic analysis. ' 48 Even those scientists who, in light of'genetic
diversity, dismiss racial classifications based on visible features as an error
of the past may fail to see that the representational or imaginary physiology
of racial groups persists as a mixture of "superficial" nature and cultural
invention.
From this [latter] perspective, "man" would be that animal who
lives not by nature alone, but by symbolic norms that provide a
supplementary means by which the population would regulate itself
.... To arrive at a properly human science, we must isolate a
relationship between culture and nature, so as to suture them in a
functional hierarchy: "man" appears whenever a biological need is
"[Riace" is not wholly and completely determined by biology, but is only partially
so. Even then biology does not determine "race," but in complex interplay with
environmental, cultural, and social factors provides certain boundary conditions
and possibilities that affect raciation and the development of"geographical" races.
... Nor does the modem conceptual terrain of "evolution" provide scientifically
secure access to race-determining biological, cultural, social developmental
complexes distributed among various groups . . . . Racial categories are
fundamentally social in nature and rest on shifting sands of biological
heterogeneity.
id. at 68.47 Id. at 46-47 (quoting CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL
OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 64 (1991)).
[T]his is the alternative that contemporary debates frequently propose with regard
to a number of disparate phenomena, including race, homosexuality,
schizophrenia, and many other things: The object in question is either grounded in
biological causes, like hormones or skin color, or viewed as a social construction
that is destined to pass away, like democracy, the nation-state, or atomic weapons.
id. at 49.48 1d. at 51.
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49regulated by representation ....
In Foucault's terminology, "man appears as a being possessing functions-
receiving stimuli (physiological ones, but also social, interhuman, and
cultural ones), reacting to them, adapting himself . . . ,"o Thus when
Foucault argues that we live by representation, he is not (according to
Sheperdson) arguing for the discursive construction of all things, as if living
up to the caricatures of postmodemist theory by its critics in the culture
wars. But neither, of course, is Foucault a biological reductionist when he
speaks of adaptation. In general terms, Sheperdson appropriates Foucault to
recommend that we avoid both (i) proceeding "as if the 'natural' dimension
of the body were independent of all cultural overlay-as if the biological
domain were autonomous and prior to any merely symbolic matter,"5' and
(ii) belief in "the discursive construction of all things., 52 More specifically,
we should avoid viewing "race" as either (i) "a product of cultural practices
or a purely symbolic phenomenon ... ,5 or (ii) "a biological fact, separate
from culture and language, and from all the mechanisms of imaginary
subjectivity that denature human life. 54 Representation is "not secondary to
the biological domain; it drives raciation as much as any factor the scientists
have identified. '5
We might therefore use the term "science of difference,"
notwithstanding the risk of historical contamination, (i) to designate the
interest in "race" as a combination of "natural" features and cultural
(including historical, social, and geographic) factors, and (ii) to distinguish
that interest from discredited "race science," from the contemporary
scientific view that "race" is biologically irrelevant, and from the view that
culture is relatively powerless against "human nature." Both racism and
voluntary racial identities therefore have links to nature (in addition to their
obvious links to culture) not only because they are based in part on
superficial physical differences, but because they are based in
representational functions-we all represent each other and society, to
ourselves, even as we are represented by others and society.56
4 9
1Id. at 56-57.50 see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 357
(1966), quoted in Shepherdson, supra note 46, at 57-58.
5' See id. at 60.52 See id. at 53.
-' See id. at 60.5
4 See id. at 61.
" See id.
56 See FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 352-53.
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On the other hand, the history of race science is a reminder that
science itself is also a representation, thus any "science of difference" will
be constructed not only in accordance with observational and
methodological conventions, but also in accordance with institutional,
social, and rhetorical conventions. For example, concerns persist that "the
biological use of race in genetics, as the last refuge of racist ideologies,
continues . . . ."" One justification for using racial labels in the field of
public health is the data showing that different "racial" groups "can have
different-and potentially dangerous-reactions to common medications such
as heart drugs, tranquilizers, and painkillers. 58  However, "[r]esearchers
also may find an inherited, racial linkage where none exists, or overlook the
medical effects of what people eat, where they live and how they are treated.
Even when groups are closely related genetically, ethnic variations in diet
can radically alter reactions to medications and other important medical
characteristics . . . ,59 Nevertheless, race continues to be used as a scientific
variable in biomedical research.60
In fact, [however] the use of race and ethnicity in biomedical
research is problematic because it is caught in a tautology, both
informed by, and reproducing, "racialized truths." We assume that
racial differences exist, and then proceed to find them. While the
scientific validity of racial distinctions between human populations
has long since been disputed, the cultural logic of stratifying
populations by race/ethnicity exerts a powerful pull-it is a highly
ritualized scientific practice enshrined in law and government
regulation.6'
Because courts of law regularly "enshrine" science as a means to stabilize
legal disputes, and especially because DNA evidence represents a type of
"gold standard" in criminal trials, we should be particularly attentive to the
institutional, social, and rhetorical aspects of contemporary science.
[F]orensic genetics [stages itself] as a type of conduit that merely
delivers and brings to light, through a series of scientific
57 Joseph Pugliese, Identity in Question: A Grammatology of DNA and Forensic Genetics, 12 INT'L J.
SEMIOTICS L. 419, 438 (1999).
S8 See Robert Lee Hotz, People Are Same, but Different, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A41.
59 See id.60See Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, Joanna Mountain, & Barbara Koenig, The Meanings of "Race" in the New
Genomics: Implications for Health Disparities Research, I YALE J. HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
33, 54 (2001).
61 Id. at 55.
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methodologies, what is already there. The danger .. . is [in]
reproducing the notion that the forensic evidence is somehow
beyond the structuring operations of mediation and potential error;
.. the forensic evidence may risk appearing tautologically
scientific, that is, self-evidently factual and thereby
incontrovertible.62
To the extent, for example, that "DNA profiles are dependent on the
construction of racial and ethnic subgroups that are conceptualized in purely
biological terms, ' 63 then in light of the "widespread agreement...that
biologically distinct races do not exist," 64 the profilers are unwittingly
engaged in legendary "race science."
In the contemporary discourse of law/science relations, the tendency
to idealize science persists alongside the failure to take seriously the
institutional, social, and rhetorical features of the scientific enterprise.6 5 The
history of "race science" provides, even today, an exemplary warning to
those who view "scientific discourse .. .as a transparent medium which
simply delivers, in an unmediated manner, the resident, inner truth of
nature. 66 To the extent that a new "science of difference" breaks down the
opposition between nature and nurture in the construction of race, it also
provides a model for breaking down the opposition between nature and
society in the legal construction of science.
62 
See Pugliese, supra note 57 at 421; see Soo-Jin Lee et al., supra note 60, at 51 ("An unintended
byproduct of the genomics revolution is a naive, almost religious faith in the power of genetics. The gene
has become a powerful cultural icon; genetic explanations have a price of place in the popular
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6See Soo-Jin Lee et al., supra note 60, at 35. "The scientific evidence is clear that genetic variation does
not neatly map onto socially meaningful groups." Id. at 68. See also Stuart Hall, The Question of
Cultural Identity, in MODERNITY AND ITS FUTURES 274 (S. Hall, D. Held, & T. McCrew eds., 1993):
Race is a discursive not a biological category. That is to say, it is the organising
category of those ways of speaking, systems of representation, and social practices
(discourses) which utilize a loose, often unspecified set of differences in physical
characteristics-skin colour, hair texture, physical and bodily features, etc-as
symbolic markers in order to differentiate one group socially from another.
65 See generally David S. Caudill, Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 269 (2002).
6See Pugliese, supra note 57, at 421. "The personifying trope of 'resident' here figures identity as a
self-identical entity naturally inhering in a person's DNA." Id. at 420. "What I'm drawing attention to
here is one of the fundamental presuppositions of forensic genetics: that DNA identity predates the
operations of discursifications and textual labor; that it is always already there, merely awaiting the
exegetical work of the forensic scientist, who will simply decode, decipher and transcribe it." Id.
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